Parliamentary Immunity in Europe: A Comparative Legal Reference

The following comparative legal analysis surveys the principal models of parliamentary immunity across European jurisdictions, with reference to the standards established by the Venice Commission, the European Court of Human Rights, and the Court of Justice of the European Union. It is published by the Tirana Examiner Legal Desk as a reference document for readers following immunity-related legislative and judicial developments in Albania and the broader European context.

By The Tirana Examiner Legal Desk 

I. Parliamentary Immunity of Members of Parliament: Doctrine
Parliamentary immunity is one of the foundational principles of democratic governance across European legal systems. Rooted in the historical struggle between legislatures and executive power, it serves to protect the independence of elected representatives and, as a consequence, the integrity of the democratic process itself.

At its core, parliamentary immunity serves an institutional rather than a personal purpose. As consistently affirmed by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), this privilege is not a personal entitlement of the elected representative that places them above the law, but an institutional guarantee designed to protect the legislature as a whole from undue external pressure — whether from the executive branch, the judiciary, or political opponents.

Parliamentary immunity has accordingly been understood in two ways: as a constitutional safeguard for legislative independence against judicial and political interference, and as a potential obstacle to accountability and anti-corruption enforcement.

European legal systems recognize two distinct forms of parliamentary immunity: substantive immunity and procedural immunity.

Substantive immunity (non-accountability) provides absolute protection for opinions expressed and votes cast in the exercise of parliamentary functions. It is permanent in nature, cannot be lifted, and is directly tied to the deputy’s freedom of expression in the performance of the legislative mandate.

Procedural immunity (inviolability) protects members of parliament against certain coercive measures — such as arrest, pre-trial detention, search, and interception of communications — which may not be applied without prior parliamentary authorization. The scope of this authorization requirement varies significantly across European systems: in some jurisdictions it extends to the initiation of criminal proceedings or formal investigation, while in others it is confined to liberty-restricting and search measures. These differences are addressed in the comparative survey below.

Procedural immunity is known under different names across jurisdictions: Immunität (Germany), inmunidad (Spain), inviolabilité (France), inviolabilità (Italy), or personal immunity as the term is used in the context of the European Parliament — reflecting a common underlying rationale of shielding members from threats arising from the instrumentalization of judicial power.

Notwithstanding jurisdictional variation, procedural immunity shares several common structural features across European legislative systems: it is relative and may be lifted by parliamentary vote; it is temporally limited to the duration of the mandate; and it extends to extra-parliamentary acts. A universal exception, recognized in all systems, is that flagrante delicto situations fall outside its protection.

II. Different European Models of Procedural Immunity
European states differ substantially in the scope and design of their procedural immunity regimes. These differences can be organized into three broad categories.

A first group of states — including Germany, Spain, and Greece — requires parliamentary authorization not only for coercive measures such as arrest and search, but also for the initiation of criminal proceedings or formal investigation against a member. A second, larger group — including France, Italy, Portugal, and Slovakia — has, through legislative reform in recent decades, narrowed the authorization requirement to coercive liberty-restricting measures, leaving criminal investigation to proceed without parliamentary clearance. Albania, following its 2012 constitutional reform, belongs to this second category. A third group — including the Netherlands and Sweden — does not extend procedural immunity to extra-parliamentary acts, leaving members fully subject to the ordinary criminal process for conduct outside the parliamentary sphere.

The following is a more detailed account of the relevant models.

1. The European Parliament
The European Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, together with Articles 8 and 9 of the Protocol on Privileges and Immunities of the European Union, establish a dual immunity regime for MEPs. Article 8 provides absolute non-accountability for votes and opinions expressed in the exercise of parliamentary functions. Article 9 governs procedural immunity, referred to in this institutional context as personal immunity: in their home member states, MEPs are subject to the immunity rules applicable to their national parliament; in all other member states, they are protected from arrest and from criminal investigation and prosecution.

The CJEU clarified in its landmark ruling Junqueras Vies (C-502/19, 2019), and confirmed in Puigdemont i Casamajó and Comín i Oliveres v. Parliament (C-600/22, 2024), that MEP immunity attaches from the moment of election and does not require any formal declaration to take effect. This jurisprudence carries significant implications for the relationship between ongoing national criminal proceedings and the acquisition of the European parliamentary mandate.

2. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) also provides immunity protections for its members, though these operate through a layered framework. In the first instance, members enjoy immunity pursuant to the rules of the member state they represent. In addition, Articles 14 and 15 of the General Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the Council of Europe establish an autonomous immunity regime: Article 14 ensures absolute non-accountability for votes and opinions expressed in the exercise of parliamentary functions. Importantly, PACE’s own procedure for lifting immunity is independent of national parliamentary procedures; a national authority seeking to proceed against a PACE member must submit a separate request to the Assembly, even where national immunity has already been lifted.

3. The French Model
The French model is generally regarded as a paradigmatic instance of the continental dual system and has deeply influenced the constitutional traditions of numerous EU member states. Its legal basis is Article 26 of the 1958 Constitution.

Procedural immunity — inviolabilité — prohibits the arrest or any other deprivation or restriction of liberty of a member of parliament for criminal or correctional offenses without authorization from the relevant chamber, except in cases of flagrante delicto or final conviction. The 1995 constitutional reform substantially narrowed the scope of this protection by abolishing the requirement of parliamentary authorization for the opening of preliminary investigations and judicial searches (perquisitions). As a result, criminal investigation may now proceed freely; the authorization requirement is preserved only in relation to measures that restrict personal liberty.

4. The German Model
The German system is governed by Article 46 of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz). Its practical hallmark is the Bundestag’s adoption of a standing general authorization (Pauschalermächtigung) at the opening of each legislative term, permitting investigation of members in respect of minor offenses. For more serious matters, or where coercive measures are sought, a specific request must be submitted.

Procedural immunity — Immunität — provides that no member may be made the subject of criminal proceedings, arrested, or detained for any punishable act without the permission of the Bundestag, except where the member is apprehended in flagrante delicto. This framework, unlike the post-reform French and Italian models, thus formally requires parliamentary authorization even for the initiation of criminal proceedings, though in practice the Bundestag operates a near-automatic lifting policy and rarely refuses. Requests are submitted through the Federal Minister of Justice to the President of the Bundestag, examined by the Committee on Rules of Procedure, and decided by the full chamber.

5. The Italian Model
The Italian system is governed by Article 68 of the Constitution, substantially reformed in 1993 in the wake of the Tangentopoli investigations, which had exposed the systematic manipulation of immunity provisions to obstruct legitimate criminal proceedings.

Under the current framework, procedural immunity — inviolabilità — prohibits any search of a member’s person or premises, arrest, pre-trial detention, or other measure restricting personal liberty without prior authorization from the chamber to which the member belongs. The same authorization requirement applies to the interception of communications and to the seizure of correspondence. Requests are examined by a dedicated parliamentary committee; decisions are taken by secret ballot in plenary session.

6. The Spanish Model
The Spanish system is governed by Article 71 of the 1978 Constitution and is distinguished by the concept of aforamiento (aforos): a special jurisdictional regime under which members of the national parliament, among other senior officials, fall within the exclusive criminal jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo) for any offenses committed. This ensures that proceedings are conducted before the most senior judicial tier rather than courts of first instance.

Within this framework, procedural immunity — inmunidad — provides that members may not be arrested except in cases of flagrante delicto. Furthermore, for criminal proceedings to be formally initiated, the Supreme Court must first seek authorization from the relevant chamber (suplicatorio). Refusals by Parliament may be challenged by constitutional appeal (recurso de amparo). All immunity decisions are taken by secret ballot.

7. The Greek Model
The Greek system is governed by Articles 61 and 62 of the Constitution and provides broad immunity protections. A procedurally distinctive feature is the automatic rejection rule: if Parliament does not act on a request to lift immunity within three months of its submission, the request is deemed definitively refused by operation of law. This is a feature also found, in modified form, in the Albanian constitutional framework.

Members of the Hellenic Parliament enjoy immunity from criminal prosecution, arrest, and detention during their term of office, except in cases of flagrante delicto. They are additionally exempt from any obligation to provide information to any authority concerning the exercise of their legislative functions.

8. The Portuguese Model
The Portuguese system is governed by Article 157 of the Constitution. Procedural immunity — inviolabilidade — prohibits arrest, pre-trial detention, or any other deprivation of liberty without authorization from the Assembly of the Republic, subject to an exception for flagrante delicto in respect of crimes carrying a maximum penalty of more than three years’ imprisonment. An Ethics Committee examines requests and formulates recommendations; the final decision rests with the plenary, decided by majority vote.

9. The Czech Model
Parliamentary immunity in the Czech Republic is governed by Article 27 of the Constitution and the Act on Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies of 1995. The Czech framework requires parliamentary authorization for coercive measures against members, including criminal prosecution, arrest, and search. The Committee on Mandates and Immunities, and subsequently the full Chamber, assess whether the prosecution request is substantively genuine — that is, not politically motivated. If the Chamber refuses, prosecution is suspended for the duration of the mandate; proceedings may resume following its expiry. A notable feature of the Czech system is that re-election to the subsequent legislature reinstates immunity, requiring the prosecution to submit a fresh request for each new term.

10. The Dutch Model
The Netherlands maintains one of the most restrictive immunity regimes in the EU. Members of the States-General enjoy no procedural immunity in respect of extra-parliamentary acts: they are fully subject to arrest and criminal prosecution on the same basis as ordinary citizens. This reflects a legal tradition shaped by the Anglo-Saxon conception of parliamentary privilege — focused on conduct within Parliament — and by strong institutional confidence in the independence of the judiciary.

11. The Slovak Model
Slovakia represents the most far-reaching approach to immunity reform among EU member states. With effect from 1 September 2012, criminal inviolability was abolished in its entirety. The sole remaining protection — immunity from pre-trial detention — requires only the approval of the National Council and does not extend to prosecution itself.

12. The Albanian Case
Following the 2012 constitutional reform, Articles 73 and 103 of the Albanian Constitution provide that members of parliament no longer enjoy immunity from criminal prosecution or investigation. Procedural immunity is now confined to a narrow residual protection: parliamentary authorization is required only for measures restricting personal liberty — specifically arrest, pre-trial detention, search, and interception of communications.

The creation of the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SPAK) and the definition of its subject-matter jurisdiction did not alter this constitutional framework. Parliamentary authorization for coercive liberty-restricting measures against a deputy remains constitutionally required notwithstanding SPAK’s existence and operational competence.

In comparative perspective, Albania’s 2012 reform represents a more restrictive approach than that adopted by most Western European states, prioritizing the unimpeded exercise of criminal jurisdiction over the preservation of broader parliamentary protections.

III. European Standards
1. The General European Trend Toward Restriction
A discernible trend toward the narrowing of procedural immunity has emerged across European democracies. This trend has generally proceeded by removing the authorization requirement for investigative measures while preserving it for liberty-restricting coercive measures — particularly arrest, pre-trial detention, and personal search. The movement has not been uniform: a significant group of member states retains broader protections, and the pace and depth of reform vary considerably across jurisdictions.

Three principal approaches to the decision on whether to lift procedural immunity can be identified in comparative European practice:

Fumus persecutionis (presumption of political motivation): Under this approach, Parliament refuses to lift immunity where there is evidence that the proceedings are politically motivated — designed to damage the member’s political activity rather than to serve the genuine ends of criminal justice. This is the dominant standard in France and has historically been applied in Italy.

Fumus boni iuris (prima facie case): Under this approach, Parliament lifts immunity upon finding that the underlying criminal case is genuine and well-founded. It does not scrutinize the motivation of the prosecution but rather the substantive merit of the allegations. This standard more closely approximates judicial reasoning.

The neutrality principle (Germany): The Bundestag has formally adopted a policy of abstaining from any assessment of the merits of the underlying case, proceeding to lift immunity as a matter of course unless there is clear evidence of political abuse.

The Venice Commission has recommended that decisions on lifting immunity be grounded exclusively in legal criteria — whether fumus persecutionis or fumus boni iuris — rather than in partisan political considerations, and that clear published reasoning accompany all such decisions.

2. The Venice Commission Opinion
In 2014, the Venice Commission adopted its Report on the Scope and Lifting of Parliamentary Immunities (CDL-AD(2014)011), setting out standards intended to guide the legislation and practice of Council of Europe member states.

The Commission’s foundational position rests on the principle of proportionality, articulated in paragraph 39 of the Report: national rules on parliamentary immunity are legitimate only insofar as they are justifiable and do not extend beyond what is proportionate and necessary in a democratic society.

Three core rationales underpin parliamentary immunity as an institution:

(i) The protection of representative democracy: immunity enables deputies to discharge their democratic mandate free from external pressure, and is of particular importance for parliamentary minorities and the opposition;

(ii) The separation of powers: the immunity regime reflects and reinforces the principle that the legislature should not be subject to control or interference by the executive or judicial branches, which in turn justifies the practice of leaving the decision on lifting to the parliament itself;

(iii) Protection against politically motivated prosecution: this rationale is especially salient in legal systems where full judicial independence cannot be assumed.

The Report also acknowledges the inherent tension between immunity as a guarantee of democratic functioning and immunity as a vehicle for impunity that obstructs accountability.

The Commission identifies several principled criteria that should govern the assessment of whether to lift or preserve a member’s procedural immunity, drawing also on the Rule of Law Checklist (2016):

The immunity regime and the procedure for its lifting must have a clear legal basis and must operate through independent and transparent procedures.
Procedural immunity should serve primarily to shield the deputy against prosecution or other action that is politically motivated.
A distinction must be drawn between consolidated and transitional democracies: in states where the justice system remains fragile or insufficiently independent, there is a stronger institutional justification for retaining procedural immunity, notwithstanding the paradox that such states also tend to exhibit higher levels of political corruption.
Immunity must not extend beyond the duration of the parliamentary mandate.
Criteria and Guidelines for Lifting Immunity (Section V of CDL-AD(2014)011)

Section V of the 2014 Report sets out specific criteria and procedural guidelines that member states should apply when deciding whether to lift procedural immunity:

A. Legal Basis and Transparency

The rules governing the lifting procedure must be codified in law or in parliamentary rules of procedure. Informal, ad hoc, or wholly discretionary practices are incompatible with the principle of legal certainty.
All decisions — including decisions to refuse a request — must be accompanied by clear, published reasoning. Unreasoned decisions undermine institutional legitimacy and impede judicial review.
Procedures must be conducted transparently and must be accessible to the public to the fullest extent compatible with the rights of the member concerned.

B. The Primary Criterion: Fumus Persecutionis

The fumus persecutionis standard is recommended as the primary decisional criterion: immunity should be maintained, and the request to lift it refused, only where there is clear evidence that the prosecution is politically motivated — designed to harm the member’s political activity rather than to serve genuine law enforcement objectives.
In the absence of evidence of political motivation, the presumption should favor lifting. Parliament must not assume the role of a substitute criminal court by examining the substantive merits of the underlying accusation: that function belongs exclusively to the judiciary.
The use of immunity to shield a political ally from legitimate criminal proceedings is expressly condemned as incompatible with the rule of law. Selective application — lifting immunity against opposition members while refusing it for members of the governing majority, or vice versa — represents the paradigmatic case of institutional abuse.

3. ECtHR and CJEU Jurisprudence
Compatibility with the ECHR and ECtHR Jurisprudence

Under the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, parliamentary immunity has been recognized as compatible with the Convention — in particular with Articles 6 (right to a fair trial) and 10 (freedom of expression) — where it pursues a legitimate aim connected to the protection of parliamentary independence, is proportionate to that aim, and does not deprive affected parties of all access to a court.

The interaction between parliamentary immunity and the Convention has generated a significant body of case law. Among the leading authorities:

In Kart v. Turkey (Grand Chamber, 3 December 2009, App. No. 8917/05), the Court addressed an unusual procedural posture: the applicant was himself a member of parliament who complained that the legislature’s refusal to lift his own immunity was preventing him from defending himself against pre-existing criminal charges, thereby violating his right to a fair trial under Article 6. The Grand Chamber found no violation, characterizing inviolability as a temporary procedural obstacle that did not impair the essence of the applicant’s right to a fair trial. The Court affirmed that inviolability is not a personal privilege of the individual MP but a status-based protection that cannot be waived by its beneficiary. It further recognized that the purpose of inviolability is to prevent any possibility of politically motivated criminal proceedings (fumus persecutionis) and thereby to protect the opposition from pressure or abuse on the part of the majority — a formulation that has since been widely cited in the doctrine.

In Belpietro v. Italy (24 September 2013, App. No. 43612/10), the Court addressed a case arising from the collateral effects of substantive immunity. A newspaper article authored by an Italian senator — and subsequently found to be covered by substantive parliamentary immunity under Article 68(1) of the Constitution, resulting in the discontinuation of proceedings against the senator — gave rise to criminal liability for the newspaper’s editor under a duty-of-care provision of Italian criminal law. The ECtHR found no violation of Article 10 in respect of the editor’s conviction but held that the imposition of a suspended four-month custodial sentence was disproportionate, constituting a violation. The case is significant because it demonstrates how broad substantive immunity can displace criminal liability onto third parties, generating Convention-level proportionality concerns that the immunity regime itself does not resolve.

Taken together, these cases reflect the Court’s consistent position that the broader the immunity conferred, the more compelling the justification required, and that states bear the burden of demonstrating proportionality between the scope of immunity and the legitimate democratic purpose it serves.

CJEU Jurisprudence

Recent high-profile cases in the European Parliament — notably the Qatargate corruption affair (2022–2024), involving allegations that senior MEPs received cash payments from representatives of Gulf states, and allegations of Russian-backed political influence operations (Russiagate) — have intensified scrutiny of the MEP immunity regime and exposed weaknesses in its transparency, financial disclosure, and procedural speed.

The litigation concerning former Catalan President Carles Puigdemont has produced the most significant recent CJEU jurisprudence on the relationship between MEP immunity and national criminal jurisdiction. In C-600/22 (Puigdemont i Casamajó and Comín i Oliveres v. Parliament, September 2024), the Court confirmed that MEP immunity attaches upon election and must be respected by national authorities pending any parliamentary decision on its lifting. This ruling raises fundamental questions about the potential use of the European parliamentary mandate as a shield against domestic criminal proceedings — a concern that has given impetus to proposals for greater harmonization of immunity criteria across member states.

Taking stock of the comparative models surveyed above and of the normative framework set out by the Venice Commission, the overall conclusion is that parliamentary immunity fulfills a legitimate democratic institutional function, but that this function must be exercised in a manner consistent with the rule of law and the protection of fundamental rights. Procedural immunity is subject to persistent reform pressure across the continent, with a clear directional trend toward restriction — culminating in abolition in the Slovak case — while a substantial group of member states, including France, Italy, Spain, Greece, and Portugal, retains robust inviolability regimes shaped by deep constitutional and historical traditions.

IV. Selected Cases Across European Countries
The following survey draws on available sources, including parliamentary records and secondary legal analyses. It should be noted that no single consolidated database tracks immunity decisions comparably across jurisdictions, and the aggregate figures cited below are therefore approximations derived from multiple sources and should be read accordingly.

1. The European Parliament
The European Parliament’s consistent approach has been to lift immunity in the majority of cases referred to it, refusing only where clear evidence of fumus persecutionis is established. Across the five most recent legislative terms, roughly 17–20% of procedural immunity requests have been refused. Notable cases of refusal include the following:

Ilaria Salis (2024): Hungary requested the lifting of immunity of Ilaria Salis, an Italian teacher and left-wing activist who had been arrested in Hungary in February 2023 and subsequently elected as an MEP. The EP debated concerns about the independence of the Hungarian judiciary and conditions of detention at length; the plenary voted 306 to 305 against lifting.

Aldo Patriciello (Italy, 2011); Bruno Gollnisch (France, 2011): Both requests were refused following assessment by the relevant committee.

Oriol Junqueras (Spain, 2019): Former Catalan Deputy President Junqueras was held in pre-trial detention when elected as an MEP in June 2019. On referral by the Spanish Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo), the CJEU ruled in December 2019 that election as MEP conferred immunity automatically, and that member states were obliged to facilitate the exercise of the mandate by newly elected members. Spain declined to release him. The European Parliament did not lift his immunity.

Puigdemont & Comín (Spain/Catalonia, 2021–2026): Former Catalan President Puigdemont and two colleagues were elected MEPs in 2019 while residing abroad to avoid Spanish criminal proceedings. Spain requested the lifting of their immunity to enable extradition. The EP lifted their immunity in March 2021. The decision was challenged before the CJEU, which ruled in February 2026 that the procedure had been procedurally defective and annulled the 2021 decisions, with the effect that immunity was restored. This case represents the leading European precedent on the requirements of procedural impartiality in immunity-lifting proceedings and on the restoration of immunity upon election.

Bernard Tapie (France): Tapie, a French MEP and former minister, was under investigation for match-fixing and corruption in sport. French authorities sought authorization for pre-trial detention in the course of a criminal investigation. The EP refused, finding no evidence that Tapie would abscond or obstruct the investigation, and concluding that the criminal proceedings could continue without recourse to arrest.

Peter Magyar (Hungary, 2025): Magyar, who had become the principal opposition figure in Hungary and whose Tisza party was polling above Fidesz ahead of the 2026 parliamentary elections, was the subject of three separate immunity-lifting requests by the Hungarian government, on charges of theft and defamation. The EP committee refused all three requests, finding the charges to be politically motivated — a clear case of fumus persecutionis.

Klára Dobrev (Hungary, 2025): Dobrev, a Socialist MEP and wife of former Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány, was the subject of a Hungarian immunity-lifting request on defamation charges. The EP refused the request, finding that it formed part of the same systematic pattern of judicially mediated political persecution of opposition figures evident in the Magyar and related cases.

2. The German Bundestag
The Bundestag lifts immunity in the substantial majority of cases; available data suggests a refusal rate of approximately 5–10%. Notable instances in which arrest authorization was refused include:

Bernd Scheelen (2000): An SPD deputy investigated for receipt of payments from energy companies characterized as undisclosed travel expenses and treated as abuse of office. The Bundestag declined to authorize criminal proceedings.

Sebastian Edathy (2014): Immunity was lifted to permit investigation, but Parliament declined to authorize arrest.

Georg Nüßlein (2021): Immunity was lifted in the context of a COVID-related contracts investigation to permit investigation and searches; no authorization for arrest was granted.

Claudia Roth (2023): Roth, a former Federal Minister of Culture and member of the Greens, was accused in connection with political statements. The Bundestag refused the request on the ground that the matter fell within the scope of substantive immunity (nicht-strafrechtliche Immunität).

3. Italy
Italy’s refusal rate across both chambers has exceeded approximately 25% of requests. Significant cases in which authorization was refused include allegations of corruption, abuse of office, and organized crime connections:

Nicola Cosentino (2010–2011): arrest authorization refused; Alfonso Papa (2012): arrest authorization refused; Augusto Minzolini (2013): authorization for interception refused; Augusto Minzolini (2015).

Matteo Salvini (2019): As Minister of the Interior, Salvini directed that 190 migrants rescued at sea by the Italian Coast Guard be held aboard the vessel Diciotti for several days without being permitted to disembark, characterizing the decision as a collective act of government. The Catania Prosecutor’s Office sought authorization to prosecute for the offenses of unlawful detention and abandonment of persons in danger. The Senate Authorization Committee refused, accepting the argument that the challenged act was a governmental and collective decision for which criminal responsibility could not be attributed individually. The case was closed without prosecution.

4. France
France maintains a high rate of refusal of immunity-lifting requests, estimated at approximately 60% in some analyses — a figure that reflects the narrow scope of the authorization requirement following the 1995 reform, which, by covering only liberty-restricting measures rather than the initiation of proceedings, nonetheless generates frequent requests at the arrest and detention stage.

Serge Dassault (2014): Dassault, a senator and prominent industrialist, was under investigation for alleged electoral corruption and vote-buying in the commune of Corbeil-Essonnes. Two investigating magistrates requested Senate authorization for his arrest and examination. The Senate refused, taking the view that arrest was disproportionate and that the investigation could proceed without restricting his parliamentary mandate.

Gérald Darmanin: Darmanin, as Minister of Justice, was the subject of allegations of rape and abuse of authority in connection with events alleged to have occurred in 2009. The Paris Prosecutor’s Office opened an investigation in 2017; proceedings were discontinued in 2018 for insufficient evidence, then reopened following a further complaint. The Cour de Justice de la République — the specialized court competent to try ministers for acts committed in the exercise of their functions — ruled in 2022 to discontinue the case definitively for lack of sufficient evidence to proceed. This case did not involve a request for the lifting of parliamentary immunity, as the alleged conduct predated his appointment as minister.

Éric Dupond-Moretti: When serving as Minister of Justice from 2020, Dupond-Moretti was accused of conflict of interest and abuse of authority in connection with the initiation of administrative disciplinary proceedings against magistrates with whom he had previously clashed in his capacity as a defence counsel. The case was tried before the Cour de Justice de la République, which acquitted him in 2023. No arrest was at any stage authorized or sought.

President Sarkozy: Notwithstanding multiple criminal charges and proceedings against him, no coercive liberty-restricting measures were authorized in connection with his parliamentary or governmental status.

Marine Le Pen (2018): Requests for arrest authorization were refused on several occasions, notwithstanding the prior lifting of immunity for the purpose of criminal investigation.

5. Greece
Greece maintains a high rate of refusal of immunity-lifting requests. In the most recent case of note, criminal responsibility was alleged against two former Ministers of Transport in connection with a fatal railway accident in 2023. The European Public Prosecutor’s Office investigated the prospect of criminal liability. Under the Greek Constitution, the investigation of ministers requires parliamentary authorization. The request was refused and the matter was archived.

6. Poland
Marcin Romanowski (2024): Romanowski, Deputy Minister of Justice and simultaneously a member of the PACE delegation, was accused of the misappropriation of 112 million PLN from the Justice Fund. The Polish Parliament lifted his national immunity in July 2024. When authorities sought to execute an arrest warrant, Romanowski invoked his status as a PACE delegate. The President of PACE addressed a communication to the Polish authorities confirming that delegate status conferred immunity under the General Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the Council of Europe. The Warsaw District Court ordered his release; the appellate court confirmed the ruling. Romanowski subsequently left Poland for Hungary, where he obtained political asylum. PACE lifted his immunity in October 2024 following a second formal request, but he remained in Hungary.

7. Czech Republic
On 5 March 2026, the Czech Chamber of Deputies voted to refuse two separate immunity-lifting requests: one seeking to expose Prime Minister Andrej Babiš to criminal proceedings in connection with alleged EU subsidy fraud, and one seeking to expose Chamber President Tomio Okamura to prosecution for the alleged incitement of racial hatred through campaign materials used during the 2024 European Parliament election. Both refusals were carried by the governing coalition majority.

V. Conclusions from European Standards
Parliamentary immunity is understood as a means of protecting the legislature itself against undue pressure and interference from external actors, including the executive, the judiciary, and political opponents. (Venice Commission Opinion, para. 22)
Procedural parliamentary immunity is conceptually and historically linked to the principle of the separation of powers. Its underlying rationale is that the executive and judicial branches must not be in a position to interfere with the exercise of legislative functions by instrumentalizing criminal or other legal proceedings against members of parliament. (para. 37)
The decision on whether to lift or preserve immunity rests with parliament itself. This arrangement reflects the full historical development of parliamentary immunity as a mechanism for protecting the legislature against improper external pressure. As long as that rationale is accepted as valid, it follows that parliament alone should determine whether immunity should be waived. (para. 127)
Parliamentary procedures for the lifting or preservation of immunity must be guided by the principles of proportionality and necessity in a democratic society. This is the primary normative criterion against which any immunity-related decision must be assessed.
In many member states, the decision on immunity has been treated as an essentially political act within parliament’s own discretionary competence, not subject to review or direction by any external institution. (para. 135)
This approach requires care: it carries a risk of conflict with the principle of the presumption of innocence as protected under the ECHR, insofar as a parliamentary vote against lifting may be perceived by the public and media as a political determination of guilt. Such a perception would constitute a violation of the foundational separation-of-powers principle under which criminal responsibility can only be assessed by a court. (para. 149)
The primary institutional justification for parliamentary procedures on immunity is to protect the functioning of parliament as a collective institution against executive and prosecutorial pressure, and to protect individual members against politically motivated complaints or criminal accusations deployed as instruments of partisan conflict. (para. 152)
The Venice Commission recognizes that this logic does not operate equally across all democratic systems. In states that remain in democratic transition, or where democratic institutions are not yet fully consolidated, there is documented experience of prosecutorial and police power being deployed to discredit, suppress, or destroy political opponents, including members of parliament. In such contexts, procedural immunity can serve as a necessary corrective to structural weaknesses in the separation of powers. (para. 154)
The criteria that should govern a decision to refuse the lifting of immunity are as follows:

Where the charges are clearly and manifestly without substantive foundation;
Where the charges are the unintended legal consequence of a political act rather than the result of genuine criminal conduct;
Where there is clear evidence that the charges are politically motivated (fumus persecutionis) — that is, designed to threaten, intimidate, or otherwise interfere with the mandate of the member concerned;
Where the continuation of the legal proceedings would pose a material risk to the democratic functions of parliament or to the fundamental rights of a member or group of members. (para. 188)

The Tirana Examiner Legal Desk provides analysis of legal and constitutional questions bearing on Albania’s governance and EU accession trajectory. This analysis reflects the editorial position of the Tirana Examiner.

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