by Albatros Rexhaj (Tirana)
Ditmir Bushati has written a note about Albania’s EU accession process that reads, at first encounter, like serious intervention. The concern he raises, that the public debate has been hollowed out into a performance of slogans while the substantive reform conversation goes unexamined, is not wrong. But a legitimate concern and a credible argument are not the same thing. Read with care, the note has structural problems serious enough to undermine the intervention it claims to be making.
Start with the transparency charge, which sits at the center of his critique. Bushati argues that the government has failed Albania by keeping its negotiating position confidential, denying parliament, civil society, media, and business the ability to participate meaningfully in the process. This sounds damning until you remember how EU accession negotiations actually work.
The confidentiality of negotiating positions is not an Albanian government invention. It is structural to the process itself. Intergovernmental conferences, Council working groups, the entire architecture through which candidate countries move toward membership operates under disclosure rules designed to protect negotiating space until conclusions are reached. The EU publishes its common positions. Candidate countries do not publish theirs. This is not opacity as a political choice. It is the procedural grammar of accession.
The more sophisticated version of this critique, one Bushati gestures toward without quite making, is that domestic consultation processes could still exist independently of what reaches the formal negotiating table. That is true in principle. But Albania is not outside European practice here. The degree of parliamentary and civil society involvement in accession negotiations has varied significantly across candidate and recent member states, and several countries that are now full members conducted their processes with domestic consultation levels comparable to or lower than Albania’s current arrangements. Before the failure can be declared, the standard against which it is being measured needs to be established. The note never establishes it.
The second problem is the alternative Bushati offers. Having criticized the government for reducing the debate to slogans and checkboxes, he produces his own list of approximately fifteen transformational outcomes that Albania should be pursuing instead. Corruption eliminated. Emigration reversed. A meritocratic administration. Innovation-driven entrepreneurship. Property rights secured. A knowledge economy built. The list carries no sequencing, no institutional pathway, no budgetary logic, no timeline discipline. It is not a framework. It is a different register of slogan, more elevated in tone, equally untethered from the conditionalities and trade-offs that separate reform argument from aspiration.
No country in the history of EU enlargement has achieved that constellation of outcomes through or alongside accession. Romania and Bulgaria joined in 2007 and are still contending with rule of law deficits, judicial independence gaps, and corruption penetration in critical sectors that accession did not resolve. The implicit standard Bushati sets makes any measurable progress look insufficient by definition. A serious intervention would have identified two or three structural reforms, explained why they are prerequisites for the rest, and made the case that the current pace is failing on those specific measures. That piece was not written.
There is also a contradiction the note never resolves. Bushati writes that Albanians have no hesitation about the European path and that the merit of this aspiration belongs entirely to them. He then spends the entirety of the piece treating them as passive spectators to a process managed above their heads. If citizens are the protagonists he says they are, the argument owed them something concrete: what parliamentary oversight of the accession track should look like, which sectoral consultations are missing, where policy trade-offs are being made without public accountability. The empowerment declaration is ornamental. It does no analytical work.
What the piece ultimately is, beneath the technocratic register, is political commentary that declines to identify itself as such. It adopts a tone that aligns with external skepticism about Albania’s accession trajectory without owning that alignment, and criticizes the government for narrative substitution while performing a version of it. That is not a disqualifying observation. Politicians write political pieces. But the refusal to declare what the note is, the shelter taken behind the language of procedural concern, mirrors the inauthenticity it sets out to expose.
The debate Bushati says he wants is worth having. Albania’s accession conversation is genuinely thin on substance, and the question of how European standards translate into better governance deserves sustained public attention. But a piece that substitutes moral register for policy structure, and rhetorical elevation for analytical method, does not advance that debate. It performs participation in it.
Read Bushati’s Op Ed “For Albania’s Affairs”